Jason Michael Wright v. State of Utah : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
Jason Michael Wright v. State of Utah : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lambertus Jansen; Attorney for Respondent;
Gordon P. Esplin; Attorney for Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Wright, No. 15272 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/683
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of: 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT, Case No. 15272 
A Minor. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
An appeal from the Adoption of Jason Michael Wright 
from the Third Judicial District Court 
LAMBERTUS JANSEN 
DOUGLAS P. DeJULIO 
MFT Plaza, Suite S-1 
105 East 5900 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Respondent 
GORDON F. ESPLIN 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
216 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
~ ~ n I~ E D u L~ 
G ~ ~ I ;;a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE---------------------------------- l 
DISPOSITION IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT------------- l 
FACTS----------------------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS 
FINDING "THAT IT WAS ALMOST A 
STATUTORY RAPE AND IT IS THE COURTS 
(SIC) OPINION THAT HE NEVER ACQUIRED 
ANY RIGHTS BY BEING THE FATHER, 
EITHER BY STATUTE AND OR BY COMMON 
LAW"--------------------------------- 5 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS 
FINDING, "THAT HE ABANDONED THE 
CHILD AND FORFEITED ANY RIGHTS 
THAT HE MAY HAVE HAD"---------------- 8 
CONCLUSION------------------------------------------ 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Page 
Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc. 2d 202, 165 
N.Y.S. 2d 290 (1957)----------------------------- 7 
In re Adoption of Jameson, 20 Utah 2d 53, 
432 P.2d 881 (1967)- ---------------------------- 10 
In re Adoption of Walton, 123 U. 380, 259 
P.2d 881 (1953)---------------------------------- 9,10 
Jensen v. Earley, 63 U. 604, 612, 228 P. 217, 
220 (1924)--------------------------------------- 9 
Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 (1977)---------- 10 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 31 L Ed. 2d 
551, 92 S Ct 1208 (1972)------------------------- 5,6 
State In Interest of M, 25 U. 2d 101, 476 P.2d 
1013 (1970)-------------------------------------- 6 
State In Interest of Summers Children v. 
Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 at 334 (1977)--------- 12 
Thomas v. Chil~ren's Aid Society of Ogden, 
12 U.2d 235, 239; 364 P.2d 1029 (1961)----------- 6 
STATUTES CITED 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Matter of the 
Adoption of: 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JASON MICHAEL WRIGHT, Case No. 15272 
A Minor. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, John Wayne Cox, claims that in the May 6, 
1977 and June 1, 1977, orders and decree in this adoption 
proceeding of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
Judge presiding incorrectly applied the laws of Utah in 
terminating all appellant's parental rights to his son Jason 
Michael Wright. 
DISPOSITION IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
On December 7, 1976, Jason Michael Wright's natural 
mother Sherrie Lynn Wright Marsden and her husband Dee C. 
Marsden petitioned the Third District Court that Mr. Marsden 
be allowed to adopt the minor child Jason Michael Wright 
(Record before the Utah Supreme Court pages 2 and 3, hereafter 
references to the Record before the Utah Supreme Court will 
be cited as "R." with ''p." standing for page or pages). 
John \Jayne Cox filed an answer and affidavit in opposition 
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to said petition (R.p. 5-ll). Because John Wayne Cox did 
not appear at the February 10, 1977, hearing the petition 
was granted as prayed by Judge Banks (R.p. 12-18). Subse-
quently, John W. Cox moved that the Decree of Adoption be 
set aside (R. p. 19). On March 25, 1977, pursuant to further 
hearing before Judge Banks the February 10, 1977, Decree of 
Adoption was set aside (R.p. 24-25). Judge Banks then ruled 
that John Wayne Cox had no parental rights to his son or 
that he had abandoned his son and therefore again granted 
the adoption as prayed (R.p. 36-42). 
FACTS 
Between November 1971 and August 1972, John Wayne Cox 
and the then Sherrie Lynn Wright maintained an amorous 
relatlor c~,r Transcript, page 4 line 25 to page 5 line l; 
hereinafter references to the transcript will be cited "T." 
with "p." denoting the page or pages, and "1." the line or 
lines). Prior to August 1972 when Miss Wright learned she 
was pregnant they planned to marry but she changed her mind 
(T.p.S,l. 2-7). After learning that a criminal charge 
alleging bastardy and carnal knowledge had been filed against 
him, John Wayne Cox went to the State of Oregon (T.p. 5, 
l. 8-24). On October 13, 1972, Mr. Cox was arrested (T.p.6, 
l. 14-18) and jailed for one week (T.p. 7,1. 22-23, T. p. 
38,1. 16-18) in Oregon on a fugitive complaint from the 
State of Utah on the bastardy and carnal knowledge charges 
filed by Miss lvright 's mother (T .p. 74, 1. 28-30 ar,d T. p. 
55,1. 27 thru p. 56,1.4). The crim1nal charges were dismissE 
-::-
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit lP,T.p. 7, 1. 25-28) on the condition 
Mr. Cox stay away from Miss Wright (T.p. 75, 1. 1-30, 
T.p. 76, l. 1-13 and T. p. 73, 1. 12-21). While in Oregon, 
Mr. Cox was afraid to contact Miss Wright because a Dectective 
informed him that the criminal actions against him would be 
reinstated if he contacted her (T.p. 20,1. 24 through T. p. 
21, 1. 8). On January 3, 1973, Mr. Cox enlisted in the 
United States Marine Corps (T.p. 21, 1. 21-22). Mr. Cox 
wrote to Miss Wright's Bishop, Smoke Hills, requesting that 
Miss Wright and the unborn child be given a blessing 
(T.p. 21, 1. 26-30 and T.p. 22, 1. 1, 8-13). The parties' 
child was born March 11, 1973 (T.p. 13, 1. 17-21; that Mr. 
Cox is the father see T.p. 17, 1. 24-25, and T.p. 47, 1. 
9-15). On or about April 1, 1973, Mr. Cox returned to Utah 
and was anxious to learn of his newborn child (T.p. 22, 
1. 14-25). Since he was afraid of being arrested he did not 
contacc Miss Wright directly (T.p. 22, 1. 25-29) but got the 
desired information from the Bishop (T. p. 22, 1. 30, T.p. 
23, 1. l-10). On or about July l, 1973, Mr. Cox was again 
in Utah and visited his four (4) month old son (T.p. 25, 
l. 14-30; T. p. 51, l. 3-7; and T.p. 76, 1. 18-19). In 
mid July, 1973, Mr. Cox was sent to Japan (T.p. 27, 1. 
28-30 and T. p. 28, 1. 1-6). While in Japan, Mr. Cox telephoned 
Miss Wright (T.p. 28, 1. 14-15; T.p. 48, 1. 4-6). While in 
Japan, Mr. cox aranged for Miss Wright to receive an alotment 
for Jason (the parties' child) which she asked to be terminated 
-3-
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(Exhibit 2 p; and T. p. 28, l. 23-30; T.p. 29, l. 30 through 
p. 30, 1. 6) In April, 1974, Mr. Cox returned to the United 
States and telephoned Miss Wright from California (T.p. 30, 
l. 8-18). In the California telephone conversation Miss 
Wright informed him that if he bothered her when he got back 
she would call the police (T.p. 51, l. 23-30). 
Since April 1974 Mr. Cox has been keeping track of his 
son Jason through Miss Wright's brother and sister-in-law 
Mr. Mike and Mrs. Kathy Wright (T.p. 32, 1. 9-20, T.p. 60, 
l. 10-14; T.p. 60, l. 20-21; T.p. 61, l. 7-10; T.p. 62, 
l. 3-9; T. p. 70, 1. 18-25, T.p. 71, 1. 1-5; T.p. 71, l. 
16-18). Through these contacts Mr. Cox learned that Jason 
was in the Cottonwood Hospital. He went to see his son but 
abort"'d '-l1e errand after entering the hospital because he 
was afraid of being arrested if Miss Wright was there and 
she construed the visit bothersome (T.p. 31, 1. ll top. 32, 
l. 2). 
In August 26, 1975, Mr. Cox was seriously injured in a 
motorcycle collision and was ordered by his physician not to 
work until March 25, 1977. In May 1976 Mr. Cox sought legal 
assistance in obtaining visitation with his son (T.p. 32, 
l. 28 through p. 33, 1. 6) but because of his poverty could 
not retain an attorney (T.p. 33, l. 15-22). 
In June 7, 1976, Mr. Cox acknowledged his paternity of 
Jason on a Utah Division of Health form (Exhibit 3 P). 
Besides the above, Mr. Cox claims: (l) by telephone he 
inquired of Miss Wright on seucral o~cassions about Jason 
-4-
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(T.p. 18, l. 6-12, T. p. 23, l. ll-25, T.p. 24, l. 2-16, 
T.p. 30, l. 21-30 through p. 31, l. 10). (2) by letter he 
inquired of Jason (T.p. 24, l. 5-16, p. 28, l. 7-22). (3) 
offered financial assistance (T.p. 24, 1. 30 to p. 25, 
l. 12; p. 26, l. l-7) and (4)•he gave her at least $200.00 
(T.p. 32, l. 3-8). On the other hand Miss Wright does not 
remember any inquiry about Jason (T.p. 51, 1. 8-22) though 
she admits Mr. Cox was very attentive to her while he was 
out of Utah (T.p. 42, 1. 15-16). Furthermore, Miss Wright 
remembers she was afraid of Mr. Cox (T.p. 53, 1. 1-30), 
wanted him to stay away from her and Jason (T.p. 55, 1. 
4-8) She intended to call the police if he carne around 
(T.p. 55, 1. 9-11, 24-26), and she never encouraged a 




The District Court erred in its finding "that it was 
almost a statutory rape and it is the Courts (sic) opinion 
that he never acquired any rights by being the father, 
either by statute and or by common law ... (R.p.36) ." 
A. The United States' Constitution protects the unwed 
father's rights to his child. 
The lead case is Stanley v. Illinois,405 US 645, 31 L 
Ed 2d 551, 92 S Ct 1208 (1972). In Stanley upon the death 
of the natural mother an Illinois Court ordered the children 
into foster homes because the biological parents had not 
lJ<'CJl married, so the natural father had no rights to the 
-5-
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children. The United States Supreme Court reversed and 
specifically held that the unwed father must be granted the 
same opportunity to custody of his children as a wed father 
because of the due process clause and equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Stan~ is still the law of the land. 
B. The laws of the State of Utah protect the unwed 
father's rights to his child. 
Until 1966 it was clear that under the provisions of 
78-30-4, U.C.A. (1953), an illegitimate child could be 
adopted upon the consent of only the mother. The putative 
natural father had no standing in regard to such child 
Thomas v. Chlldren's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 U.2d 235, 
239; 364 p. 2d 1029 (1961). §78-30-4, U.C.A. (1953) then 
provided: 
A legitimate child cannot be adopted without 
consent of its parents, if living, nor an 
illegitimate child without consent of its 
mother, if living ... 
However, this provision was amended in 1966 to provide: 
A child cannot be adopted without consent of each 
living parent, having rights in relation to said 
child ... 
Subsequent to said amendment, the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized rights in a natural father. In State In Interest 
of M, 25 U.2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013, (1970), the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed for the first time the issue of ~hether the 
father of an illegitimate child, where he has publicly 
acknowledged it, has a legal right to care, custody, and 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
control of his child. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
... since the father of the illegitimate 
child has been given the statutory duty 
to support and educate the child, inde-
pendent of the bastardy proceedings, he 
should have the corresponding right to 
the custody of the child in the proper 
case ... Since the father's duty to support 
and educate the child is the same extent 
as if the child was born in lawful wedlock, 
it should follow that the father's right 
to custody should be almost as co-extensive. 
Id. at 1016. 
The court followed Fierro v. Ljubicich, 5 Misc. 2d 
202, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (1957) saying: 
the court stated that it was a fundamental 
principle that no court can, for any but 
the gravest reasons, transfer a child from 
its natural parent to any other person, 
since the right of a parent, under natural 
law, to establish a home and bring up 
children is a fundamental one and beyond 
the reach of any court. This rule applies 
to illegitimate as well as legitimate 
children. Id. at 1017, emphasis added. 
The Utah Supreme Court then explained that: 
The common law doctrine of filius nullius has 
been superceded by legislative action. A 
statutory parent-child relationship has been 
established between the publicly acknowledged 
child and his putative father that places the 
child in parity with a legitimate child in 
rights of support, education, and inheritance. 
Id. at 1017. 
The trend is to eliminate all distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate children. The Utah Legislature 
continues to reflect the modern trend when in 1975, it again 
amended §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, by adding to it 
suL>sections 3 (a) (b) (c) and (d). Those new sections clearly 
spell out the manner in which a father of an illegitimate 
ch1ld may claim his rights. There, the legislature requires 
-7-
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that the natural father file an acknowledgement of paternity 
with the Bureau of Vital Stati~tics. Once that acknowledge~ 
has been filed, an adoption may not be granted without conser 
of the natural father, or a showing of his abandonment of 
the child. It i~ clear from those amendments that the Utah 
Legi~lature wants to protect the rights of natural fathers 
and lays out clear guidelines as to the manner in which 
those right~ are to be safeguarded. 
John Cox has followed the statutory scheme to acknowledc 
his son by filing the requisite notice with the Utah Bureau 
of Vital Statistics. His paternity is not contested and he 
has stated, under oath, in open court, that he is ready and 
willing to as~ume all duties and obligations that are contiru 
on his parenthood. Mr. Cox has not been convicted of any 
criminal act relating to the circumstances of his son's 
birth or his prior relationship with Mrs. Marsden. The 
court cannot properly view him as anyone but a natural 
father attempting to assert rights in his natural son. If 
the bastardy charges against Mr. Cox had been successfully 
pursued under Utah law Mr. cox would have certain rights to 
his child. (77-60-12, U.C.A. as amended). 
POINT II 
The District Court erred in its finding, "that he 
abandoned the child and forfeited any rights that he may 
have had (R.p.36) ." 
The legal ~tandard to be follov1ed in this lil~>.'sui t is 
set out in §78-30-5, U.C.A. 
-8-
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78-30-5. Adoption of deserted child.--A child deserted 
by its parent or parents, and having no legal guardian, 
may be adopted as in this chapter provided, without 
the consent of the parent or parents having deserted 
said child, when the district court in which the 
proceedings are pending shall determine that such child 
has been deserted by its parent or parents. 
Realizing that desertion is difficult to prove the Utah 
Legislature relaxed the standard by amending the above 
statute effective May 10, 1977. 
The seminal case interpreting what desertion or abandonment 
means under the pre May 10, 1977, statute, which is the law 
in this lawsuit, is In re Adoption of Walton, 123 u. 380, 
259 P.2d 881 (1953). There the court stated: 
Courts have not hesitated to build a strong fortress 
around the parent child relation, and have stocked 
it with ammunition in the form of established rules 
that add to its inpregnability. To sever the relation-
ship successfully, one must have abandoned the child, 
and such abandonment must be with a specific intent so 
to do - an intent to sever all correlative rights and 
duties incident to the relationship. Such intent must 
be proved by him who asserts it, by proof that not only 
preponderates, but which must be clear and satisfactory, 
something akin to that degree of proof necessary to 
establish an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or, 
as one authority puts it "by clear and indubitable 
evidence." Id. at 883. 
Perhaps this Court has traveled as far as any in 
giving expression to the type of abandonment intended 
to exist in order to sever parental ties when we said 
in a custody case, that 'abandonment, in such cases, 
ordinarily means that the parent has placed the child 
on some doorstep or left it in some convenient place 
in the hope that someone will find it and take charge 
of it, or had abandoned it entirely to the chance or 
fate." [citing Jensen v. Earley, 63 u. 604, 612, 228 
P. 217, 220 (1924).] Id. at 883, 884 
In Walton, the court reversed a Decree of Adoption holding 
that the evidence of separation and non-support did not 
sustain the finding of abandonment by the natural father. 
-9-
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Id. at 382-385 259 P.2d at 883-884. This position has been 
reaffirmed by the Utah Court when no desertion was found 
In re Adoption of Jameson, 20 Utah 2d 53, 432 P.2d 881 
( 196 7) even though the natural mother was away from her 
child because of reoccurring imprisonment for criminal 
activity. 
In the case at hand, there is nothing in the record 
that evidences a clear, specific, intentional severing of 
parental rights and duties by Mr. Cox when he was threatened 
with incarceration if he tried to contact his child. 
Clearly the very high burden of proof that Utah courts 
require for a finding of abandonment has not been met. 
The Supreme Court of Utah most recently reaffirmed 
Walton, ~upra, on February 9, 1977, in the case of Robertson 
v. Hutchlson 560 P.2d 1110 (1977). There the court cites 
In re Adoption of Walton, supra, and goes on to state: 
Accordingly the court does not easily find such 
abandonment, but will do so only when the 
evidence is clear and convincing that the 
parent has either expressed an intention, or 
so conducted himself as to clearly indicate an 
intention, to relinquish parental rights and 
reject parental responsibilities to his child. 
Id. at 1112. 
The facts of Robertson v. Hutchison show that the Robertsons 
had filed a Petition to adopt two children of Mr. Robertson 
by his former marriage to Judith Ann Hutchison. The former 
wife filed objections to said adoption. Mrs. Hutchison had 
practically no contact with her children from September of 
1970 until the summer of 1975. The Utah Supreme Court took 
-10-
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into consideration the fact that Mrs. Hutchison was without 
financial means to visit or to attempt to obtain custody of 
her children untl 1975. The Court pointed out that she was 
involved in a serious automobile accident in 1971 for which 
she was hospitalized and received extensive and expensive 
medical treatment. While not excusing Mrs. Hutchison's 
conduct, the Court found that she had not abandoned her 
children. 
The child, Jason, was born March 11, 1973. Mr. Cox 
visited his child on or about April 1, 1973. Mr. 
Cox was required to be away from his child because of military 
service between January 3, 1973 and April, 1974. During his 
military service Mr. Cox offered financial assistance which 
was accepted for a period of time but later refused. Since 
April, 1974, Mr. Cox has followed his son's progress through 
relatives. He has acknowledged his son by filing a notice 
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics as required by statute 
before the Petition for Adoption was filed herein. 
John Cox was involved in a very serious motorcycle 
accident in 1975. But for the physical and financial strain 
caused by that accident, Mr Cox would have taken affirmative 
actions to secure visitation rights with his son through the 
Courts. Mr. Cox has been precluded from establishing any 
sort of a relationship with his son because of the threat of 
criminal action against him by his child's mother and her 
parents. 
There is no "conscious disregard of the obligaions owed 
-11-
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by a parent to a child State In Ir.tccrcst of Su_mmcrs 
Children v. Wulffenstein, 560 P.2d 331 at 334 (1977)" 
in this lawsuit but a father who has been threatened with 
incarceration if he fulfilled his obligations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Third District Court erred in its order terminating 
John Cox's parental rights to his son Jason. Therefore, the 
Utah Supreme Cour~hould ~:: order. 
DATED this £day of ~ , 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1977. 
I, the ur.dersigned, hereby certify that I served the 
foregoing Brief by placing two true and correct copies of 
said Brief in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to: Lambertus Jansen and Douglas P. DeJulio, 
Attorneys for Respondent, MFT Plaza, 
5900 South, Murray, Utah 84107, this 
Suite s-1, 105 East 
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